The credibility of Indian airways is already questionable. Fudging the accident report solely deepens that notion. Photograph credit score: Getty Pictures/iStockphoto
On June 12, 2025, 241 passengers on Air India Flight AI171 died in a fiery crash shortly after takeoff in Ahmedabad, Gujarat. There was just one surviving passenger. Nineteen individuals on the bottom misplaced their lives, making it the primary crash because the Boeing 787 Dreamliner was launched into business aviation. There are over 1,175 Dreamliner flights operated by varied airways, with a mean flight time of 12 hours per day. Because the accident, the Dreamliner has flown greater than 2 million hours with out a single engine failure throughout takeoff. Within the historical past of airline operations, there have been extraordinarily uncommon cases of twin engine failure throughout takeoff. One such incident was the usMD-11 incident on November 4, 2025, because of engine separation. After this accident, the US Nationwide Transportation Security Board (NTSB) launched related info in its each day briefing, one thing that by no means occurs in India.
Because the crash, YouTubers on digital and social media have been spreading far-fetched theories to create an environment of worry and likewise name into query the Boeing 787’s security requirements. What goes round is a deviation from the reality, and the Indian authorities’s Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA) is delaying the discharge of the ultimate investigation report back to get their manner. The aviation minister’s promise to supply a “clear” report as quickly as attainable, introduced the day after the crash, seems to have been veiled as simply one other phrase, as is the norm in all Indian air accident experiences.
Right here is the chronology. The crash occurred on the afternoon of June 12, 2025. Based on an ANI report, one of many flight recorders was recovered from the roof of the constructing the place the aircraft crashed on June 13, 2025. A second flight recorder was recovered from the wreckage on June 16, 2025. The Air Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) laboratory in Delhi downloaded and accessed the information as much as June 25, 2025. AAIB’s interim report was launched on July 12, 2025. However the report was sketchy and solely created extra questions than solutions.
“Menace recognition”, a mysterious command
What has not caught the eye of many is the Ministry of House Affairs (MHA) order to offer the AAIB chief with 24/7 “X-category commando safety” primarily based on risk perceptions recognized by intelligence businesses. Since 1973, I’ve adopted aviation accident investigations by the Nationwide Transportation Security Board and the British Air Accident Investigation Department (AAIB), and I’ve by no means encountered an accident investigator who required particular forces safety. The order went into impact on June 16, simply three days after the primary flight recorder was recovered. It seems that MHA and MoCA have been conscious of information that weren’t disclosed to the general public.
Had the Air Ministry been clear in regards to the outcomes of its investigation into the crash, the weird theories and wild hypothesis may have been prevented. All that was required was a fast public readout of AI 171’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR) from the start of the takeoff run till the time of crash and the recording stopped, which took simply 1 minute and 40 seconds. The cryptic passage of the dialog between the pilots within the preliminary accident report, “Why did you try this…I did not try this,” solely added to all of the outlandish theories.
What the information exhibits
The preliminary report revealed that the co-pilot was the pilot answerable for the flight, and the captain was the pilot’s supervisor (performing the duties of the co-pilot). Air India’s procedures require the captain to function the thrust levers till the takeoff pace is reached. The co-pilot will probably be answerable for the flight. When this pace name (autocall) is reached, the captain releases the thrust levers. Based mostly on the preliminary report, the next calls needs to be recorded within the CVR: At a rotation pace of 155 knots (reported at 08:08:35), the decision needs to be “Rotate”. The report mentioned liftoff was at 08:08:39, and a “optimistic fee name” ought to have been made when the altimeter confirmed altitude achieve. This communication is made by the captain who was monitoring the pilot. The preliminary report goes on to say that the primary and second gas management switches went to cutoff sequentially inside two seconds. This cuts off the gas provide to the engine. The gas shutoff valve closes, eradicating gas from the engine.
A golden rule of flight is that within the occasion of a critical emergency, the captain takes over management from the primary officer, who then returns to monitoring the pilot and performing any uncommon checklists prescribed by the captain. Within the crash of AI 171, the captain’s rapid name at 8:08:44 when each engines failed ought to have been “My management” and the primary officer’s rapid response ought to have been “Your management.” Have been these calls recorded within the CVR? AAIB’s workforce contains skilled Boeing 787 inspector pilots who would have recognized this had necessary dispatches and procedures been adopted. In that case, the idea (these are theories and speculations on social media) that the engine stopped because of a “energy outage” or “software program failure” might be a contributing issue to the accident. The Boeing 787’s gas management swap will get caught because of a software program or energy failure. These are spring-loaded switches that should be bodily lifted out of the “Run” gate, moved backwards, and dropped into the “Lower-off” gate. Motion to “run” to restart the engine should comply with the identical process of eradicating the swap from the “cut-off” gate, shifting ahead and dropping it into the “run” gate. The Digital Flight Knowledge Recorder (DFDR) and the CVR’s space microphones (which document all ambient sounds within the cockpit) clearly document this. The Boeing 787 inspector would have recognized this and would have listened to the CVR and brought a readout of the DFDR.
DFDR additionally data all management column actions and management deflections. Simply establish who was dealing with the controls throughout takeoff and in the course of the post-engine failure section. What the reader ought to know is what programs work and what do not within the presentation of cockpit devices. The restricted energy provide from the battery and Ram Air Turbine (RAT) limits that provide to solely important objects such because the captain’s instrument panel and the engine’s fireplace safety system, however the instrument panel in entrance of the co-pilot will probably be clean, to call one instance. This is without doubt one of the foremost the reason why the captain should instantly take over management, as there may be nothing in entrance of the primary officer. The information grow to be very clear when the CVR doesn’t point out an energetic takeover of management by the captain. Is that this why the Ministry of House Affairs and Intelligence deemed the AAIB director to have perceived a risk?
injury triggered
It takes lower than 100 days to find out the information and publish a clear report. The credibility of Indian airways is already questionable. Fudging the accident report solely deepens that notion. NTSB, AAIB-UK and Boeing are conscious of the DFDR and CVR measurements. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and all aviation regulators in international locations the place the Boeing 787 flies have cleared the plane to be used. It could be fascinating for MoCA to vary its impression that the reason for the accident was an “electrical/software program drawback” and instantly launch an investigation report. The longer the division delays this, the higher the danger that pilots will grow to be confused and unable to pay attention 100% within the cockpit and grow to be preoccupied with anticipating this hazard.
Sole survivor of Ahmedabad aircraft crash remembers horror
Captain A. (Mohan) Ranganathan is a former flight teacher pilot and aviation security advisor. He’s additionally a former member of India’s Civil Aviation Security Advisory Committee (CASAC).
